Bouchie: The Biden Family Pardon
by Tanner Bouchie
On Dec. 1, 2024, President Joe Biden granted his son, Hunter Biden (“Hunter”), a full and unconditional pardon “for those offenses against the United States which he has committed or may have committed or taken part in during the period from Jan. 1, 2014 through Dec. 1, 2024, including but not limited to all offenses charged or prosecuted (including any that have resulted in convictions) by Special Counsel David C. Weiss in Docket No. 1:23-cr-00061-MN in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware and Docket No. 2:23-CR-00599-MCS-1 in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.”
In explaining the shocking, unprecedented nature of the pardon and his relationship to the recipient, President Biden issued the following statement:
“No reasonable person who looks at the facts of Hunter’s cases can reach any other conclusion than that Hunter was singled out only because he is my son – and that is wrong. . . . I hope Americans will understand why a father and a President would come to this decision.”
A jury had found Hunter guilty of three gun-related crimes. He was scheduled for sentencing on Dec. 12, 2024, where he faced a maximum sentence of 25 years in prison. Some legal observers believed that these formerly imminent convictions might have been overturned on appeal, in part, due to Second Amendment protections.
In addition to the gun charges, Hunter had pleaded guilty to nine tax-related offenses. He was scheduled to be sentenced on Dec. 16, 2024, with a maximum potential sentence of 17 years in prison.
The pardon was designed to cover all federal crimes that Hunter may have committed during the previous 10 years and 11 months, though it specifically mentioned the pending tax and gun charges. Some legal scholars argue that pardons must specify the offenses to which they apply and that blanket pardons are unlawful. Others contend that a pardon’s general language is permissible and that it should apply to all relevant offenses.
In Burdick vs. United States, the Supreme Court reaffirmed a longstanding precedent that a pardon does not take effect until the recipient accepts it by asserting it in a legal proceeding. The Court also held that a person has the right to refuse a pardon, as was the case with a newspaper editor who declined a pardon and refused to testify before a grand jury, invoking his right against self-incrimination, as secured by the Fifth Amendment.
While Hunter has accepted the pardon in seeking dismissal of the gun- and tax-related charges, the pardon’s language and context only address those specific offenses. He has not yet indicated whether he accepts a broader pardon for other federal crimes he might have committed during the same period. This raises an unprecedented legal question: Can a recipient partially accept a pardon, rejecting some aspects while accepting others?
This issue of partial acceptance could become critical if Congress attempts to compel Hunter’s testimony in the future. He may assert his right against self-incrimination, arguing that he still faces potential legal jeopardy for crimes not explicitly covered by the pardon. While Congress may challenge this argument and seek to enforce its subpoena, any such dispute could take years to resolve in the courts.
Tanner Bouchie, an attorney, is a lifelong Hoosier and a member of the Indiana Policy Review Foundation residing with his family in Knox County.
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